Book Reviews
Hot on the paper trail to the Iraq war
Douglas Feith's Pentagon memos trace the origin of the current US predicament.
By Peter Grier | May 15, 2008 edition
War and Decision By Douglas J. Feith HarperCollins 674 pp. $27.95
War and Decision? This book might better have been called “War and Paperwork.”
That’s not meant as a criticism so much as a heads-up for the general reader. Douglas Feith’s inside account of his years in President Bush’s Pentagon is light on anecdotes about dramatic table-pounding (though it does have Gen. Tommy Franks hissing “Doug, I don’t have time for this [expletive deleted].”). But it’s replete with descriptions of meetings and quotations from memos and summaries of policies submitted for presidential approval.
So is it boring? Not for anyone who wants to understand the origins of the current US predicament in Iraq. Feith, as undersecretary of Defense for policy, played an important role in the development of post-9/11 US national security policy. In this book, he says that his goal is to counter the now-common narrative of a reckless administration that twisted intelligence and was bent from the start on war with Saddam Hussein.
It’s a serious intent, and deserves to be taken seriously. Whether his arguments will change the mind of anyone who does not already agree with him is another question entirely.
To set the stage, let’s look at the people and institutions for whom Feith has harsh words. Primary among these is former Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Secretary Powell was not antiwar so much as inscrutable, in Feith’s telling. He agreed that Saddam Hussein was dangerous but downplayed the urgency of the threat. At best, he supported the administration’s Iraq policy halfheartedly, without outlining an alternative solution.
“Powell put himself in a position where, if the war went well, he could say he supported it, and, if not, he could point to his warnings as proof that he was a prescient dove,” writes Feith.
The State Department in general does not fare particularly well in this book. Diplomats are reluctant to look to the president as their “touchstone,” complains Feith. In the run-up to the Iraq war the item over which State officials became most irate dealt not with policy but the distribution of top jobs in the planned Iraqi reconstruction administration.
CIA director George Tenet comes off better, but only just. Feith disputes Tenet’s assertion in his own memoir that he was a dissenter on the war, for instance, and accuses him of making up a purported Douglas Feith quote. And the CIA itself? Prone to leaks, overimpressed with the geopolitical value of stability, and capable of ignoring intelligence that contradicts preconceived conclusions.
Langley’s work is often difficult and dangerous, Feith writes, but “the list of important items the CIA got wrong is a long one.”
“War and Decision” provides Feith’s point of view on such controversies as his support for Iraqi exiles, including the controversial Ahmad Chalabi, and his push to get the CIA to consider evidence of possible prewar dealings between Al Qaeda and Hussein. (Long story short: He got in trouble for that last one.)
It also devotes much time to debunking what Feith claims are current misconceptions about the US and Iraq. First among them, he says, is the reason the administration went to war. It was not to uproot Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction or to spread democracy in the Middle East, but to counter a general national security threat to the US. The point after Sept. 11, 2001, was to head off the next terrorist attack, writes Feith, and that meant suppressing a range of dangerous actors, including states such as Iraq, thought to be sponsors of Palestinian and other terror groups.
“We took bin Laden seriously, but we believed that the purposes of U.S. military action after 9/11 went beyond striking at the perpetrators,” writes Feith.
How’s that working out, then? True, there hasn’t been another attack on the US homeland, and Hussein demonstrably was an evil guy. But the “perpetrators,” meaning Al Qaeda, are still with us. If anything, Iraq has provided them a motivational and recruiting tool. Even if you accept the strategy, shouldn’t there have been a sequence here? Was not the thought of quickly ending all possible terror threats a touch … hubristic?
Or more than a touch, depending on your point of view.
Feith does say the US made major mistakes in handling Iraq – such as failing to organize an adequate security force in the wake of Hussein’s ouster. Perhaps they should have sent more US troops, he writes. That’s a move opposed at the time by his then-boss, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
But the biggest misstep, Feith claims, was taking too long (14 months) to hand the keys to the country over to the Iraqi interim authority. During that period resentment of the US occupation grew, as did the Baathist insurgency.
“The occupation was a barrier to cooperation. In fact, it encouraged active opposition,” Feith writes.
Well, maybe. But given the decrepitude of the country’s infrastructure, the resistance of the old Sunni elite to accepting minority status, the influx of jihadists, and the meddling of Iran, would a quicker trip home for Coalition Provisional Authority chief Paul Bremer really have made Iraq today a more peaceful place?
Peter Grier is a staff writer based in the Monitor’s Washington bureau.
Comments
2. PC6300 | 05.16.08
You can tell a lot about a man by looking at his enemies. Simply do a web search for his name and you’ll see a nice lineup of detractors with statements as in-depth as Tom in California’s.
3. Jack Klompus | 05.21.08
And using similar tactics of argument to a) avoid having to confront opposing points of view and b) fashion that self-righteous retreat into ignorance as symbolic of the commenter’s unquestionable high moral ground.
Note also the Nostrodamus-like ability of Tom to know precisely not just Feith’s stature and reputation for the rest of human history but also what his “title” will be. One could avoid being lampooned as a cartoonish blowhard by simply reading the book and acquiring an informed opinion which you could bring, as heatedly as you wish, to an intelligent debate. But no - opt for dismissal, embrace willful ignorance as a badge of honor, and make bombastic prognostication. Brilliant.
4. Clioman | 05.21.08
Feith deserves a fair hearing, if only to add to the participants’ mosaic of claims and counter-claims–some especially self-serving–that will surely depict the Iraq War into the foreseeable future. One thing about his book that I found especially useful was the sizeable number of critical documents that he included, either in full in the appendix, or cited in the well-footnoted text. Among Feith’s more compelling points was the deeply felt concern for further attacks in the immediate post-9/11 days. Bio-weapons were especially feared, and w/good reason. (Remember the very real, but still-unexplained anthrax attacks?) Will the mouth-foaming anti-Bush types read this book? Probably not. Cheap, hind-sight shots are easy, and oh-so-satisfying. Governing in the day-to-day is more difficult.
5. Russ | 05.21.08
I find the book much more fascinating to read, if I try to not think of the outcome so far. Coming out of 9-11, most of us were ready to enlist to go kill someone. Looking at how the administration tried to deflect fast action that would not help, yet try to find and stop any upcoming terrorist activities is daunting. Things don’t always work the way we want, regardless of our planning. There were a lot of voices involved, on both sides of the issues, as the book makes clear. Will it change minds? Probably not, as those opposed to the administration will be unlikely to even read the book.
6. abu al-fin | 05.21.08
Feith’s assessment of the CIA and State Department are spot-on. You could blast those two organisations into space and the US would be much better off.
7. Richard | 05.21.08
I haven’t read this book yet, but I think the reviewer’s information on Iraq is out of date. Michael Yon’s account of General Patraeus’s successful strategy does affirm that Bremer’s rule in Iraq was the real disaster. Does anyone remember his proposed blue and white Iraqi flag?
8. bill | 05.21.08
The major problem I had with Mr Feith was the self serving but alas, professional civilian government employees are that way.
9. Byron | 05.21.08
Al Qaeda still with us? Well, yes, but vastly diminished in every way
Taking the total eradication of Al Qaeda as the criterion for success sets up an impossible standard. But it’s not even clear that eradication is the best possible outcome. In the long run, their abject failure in front of the whole world seems better than letting them acquire martyr status.
10. Whitehall | 05.21.08
I’m a hundred+ pages into the book and I’m very impressed with the strategic thinking process and results that took place immediately after 9/11.
The impulse was revenge but the rational goal for our government was to prevent further attacks. To do that, we had to play offense and make the terrorists (of all organizations) play defense. The plan of removing governments that supported and fostered terrorists was the right one.
Any conflict between smart players will not go according to plan. Just like in chess, most games have the winner losing pieces along the way.
This reviewer reminds me why I cancelled my subscription to the local newspaper and never watch network or cable news - too many journalists!
11. RKV | 05.21.08
“Architect of Disaster” my ***. We took over a country nearly the size of California in short order and with few casualties compared to similar efforts in the past (see day 1 of the Normandy invasion for equivalent deaths compared to Iraq for 5 years). We’ve killed many terrorists by attracting them to Iraq and simultaneously taking over another country (Afghanistan). Yes it has been expensive and no we’re still not done (Iran). Compared to not doing anything and letting Al-Queda have time to plan, move and attack it was a much better choice. So many people here sound just like the Copperheads did during the American Civil War - defeatist! And if it was all about the oil, why is the price of oil up?
12. Will Reade | 05.22.08
I have not read the book yet but my understanding is that it is painstakingly footnoted and supported. I suspect that if there had been a major error in the factual backing of the written statements, we would have heard it by now from the NY Times, Washington Post, etc.
I can’t say I’m exactly “looking forward” to reading it this weekend, but I will sit down and give it my best shot. I’m frankly less concerned about the history than of making sure we do the right thing going forward. There will be plenty of time for thinking about the past later. That’s why its called history, after all.
13. willis | 05.22.08
“So is it boring? Not for anyone who wants to understand the origins of the current US predicament in Iraq.”
The US has the terrorist on their heels. The rogue militias who thought they could take over the country are now facing the embarrassment of government troops walking their streets and occupying their points of power with impunity. The Iraqi goverment is beginning to coelsce into a freely elected government capable of discharging its duties and answering to its people. The direction of politics in the Mid-East and all the areas influenced by it has been profoundly affected for the better. Every passing day sees improvement and better, although lightly reported, news. The US doesn’t often find itself in such a predicament. Indeed we need to know how it came to be.
14. Steve Rosenbach | 05.23.08
I’m now on page 202 and very impressed so far. I read all three of Bob Woodward’s books on Afghanistan & Iraq War, and I thought they were good (first two more so than third.) However, a big difference I now notice with Feith’s book is that Feith does not invent dialog for meetings that he did not attend. When I really thought about it, it makes Feith seem much more factual than Woodward.
One groundbreaking aspect of the book is that Feith put all of the endnotes and reference (including hyperlinks to source document) on a web site:
http://www.waranddecision.com/chapters/
I followed the circus of Sen Levin’s hearing last year in which he had Defense Dept IG Gimbel testify about pre-war activities of Feith’s office. Gimbel said their activities were “lawful and authorized” but “inappropriate.” That’s when I started to wonder about animosity against Feith by Levin and others, as well as in CIA and State. I mean, I know what “lawful” and “authorized” mean, but please tell me the legal definition of “inappropriate.” It certainly did not sound objective.
1. Tom in California | 05.15.08
Why would anyone believe anything Feith has to say? He will go down in history (just a footnote, of course) with the title “Architect of Disaster.”