Gen. David Petraeus, commander of US Central Command, testified April 1 during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on US policy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.
(Gerald Herbert/AP)Photos (1 of 1)
Senators grill Petraeus on new Afghanistan strategy
Top concerns are troop levels and yardsticks for success
By Gordon Lubold | Staff writer/ April 1, 2009 edition
Washington
Senators grilled Pentagon officials Wednesday about the new US strategy for countering Islamist extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, pressing them on whether President Obama was committing enough troops to the fight and how America would measure progress in the region.
While lawmakers indicated general support for the new plan, unveiled March 27, some see the administration’s postponement of key decisions about troop levels as evidence that the strategy is still a work in progress.
They asked Gen. David Petraeus and others about the need to identify a target size for the Afghan army and police, and tried to probe why the president did not deploy to Afghanistan the full number of forces requested by Gen. David McKiernan, the top commander in Afghanistan.
Mr. Obama is boosting the US force in Afghanistan by about 21,000, on top of the 7,000 additional troops former President Bush had ordered to the country. But General McKiernan’s request for another 10,000 troops won’t be decided on until later this year, General Petraeus and other defense officials acknowledged this week.
“If the troops were needed, would they be sent?” asked Sen. Mel Martinez (R) of Florida.
The answer: Time-lines presented to Obama allow him to make a decision later this year that could put additional forces in Afghanistan in 2010. Unspoken but implied: A force of 10,000 simply may not be available now because of commitments in Iraq. Petraeus emphasized that the Afghanistan mission requires more than just military forces, anyway.
“While additional military forces clearly are necessary in Afghanistan, they will not by themselves be sufficient to achieve our objectives,” said Petraeus. “It is important that the civilian requirements for Afghanistan and Pakistan be fully met as well.”
A bigger Afghan force sought
Besides the added US forces, Obama’s new strategy relies on a “surge” of civilian expertise and a more defined focus on defeating extremism in the region. It also calls for a larger Afghan army – widely seen as a crucial ingredient to success in Afghanistan – but does not prescribe a specific size for the army or police.
The Afghan army is expected to grow from 90,000 to 134,000 by the end of 2011. The police force is close to reaching its 82,000 target, but many officers need retraining and, perhaps, replacement. The size of both forces should total about 400,000 in the next several years, some experts and lawmakers say.
“We know that [a larger force] was a vital element to our success in Iraq, and to dribble out these decisions, I think, can create the impression of incrementalism,” Sen. John McCain (R) of Arizona told Petraeus and other administration officials at Wednesday’s hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Senator McCain makes a good point but should temper his criticism, says Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“The word ‘incremental’ is a bit too harsh, but [McCain’s] overall points, especially about the Afghan forces, are still generally correct,” he says. “Then again, so is the general thrust of Obama’s policies – even if the goals aren’t yet ambitious enough.”
Obama’s strategy may be vague about the target size of the Afghan army as American officials negotiate for more resources from allies this week in Europe, some analysts say.
A fast troop buildup
A contingent of about 70,000 US and NATO forces is already on the ground in Afghanistan. With fresh US forces now arriving and 21,000 more soon to come, logistical challenges loom large. The US and its allies will need to build up bases and airstrips to support them.
Indeed, the US runs the risk of sending too large a force too fast, says Seth Jones, a political scientist at the RAND Corp. Besides, he says, the size of the Afghan military or the buildup of American forces is not necessarily the most important issue right now. Instead, the US must think about what incentives it will use to co-opt militants and turn them against the Taliban.
“That is a much bigger issue,” he says. The president’s Afghanistan-Pakistan plan “is not specific on how to do that…. There is a very broad statement, but it is pretty vague on how to do it and when.”
Strategy aside, concern exists in and outside the military that the US and its allies still don’t have an objective way of measuring success. Top military officials testified recently that the information in Afghanistan is far too “anecdotal” to be used effectively.
Lawmakers Wednesday echoed the concern.
“How will we assess whether the new strategy is working? How will we know if we’re winning?” asked Sen. Susan Collins (R) of Maine.
The Defense Department is working on it, answered Michele Flournoy, the Pentagon’s top policy official.
“I can promise you we will in a very short amount of time be able to come back and talk to you in detail about metrics,” she said.
Comments
2. Keita Yamamoto (Honolulu, Hawaii) | 04.01.09
I feel that i am a uneasy with the setting of “target” size for the Afghan police and military. I feel that it is for this reason that the Iraqi Police and Military became so infested with corruption and ineffectiveness. It creates a system of recruitment and training in which reaching target numbers becomes the priority, and thus the only measure of progress. I feel that quality of the manpower recruited is crucial. Otherwise the commitment in Afghanistan will become more costly in human lives and capital.
3. Sean Fay | 04.01.09
Hey, Mr. Peek?
It is accepted courtesy to identify a leader by his title in the first usage of his name (as they did by referring to him as “President Obama” in the first paragraph) and then using the simple honorific or Mr. or Ms. in subsequent references.
Just though you’d like to know that so that you could concentrate on actually responding the content of the story rather than trying to find a peripheral reason to profess to be offended because they happened to paint Mr. Obama in a less than stellar light.
Thanks for your time.
Mr. Fay
4. Ram Singh Blue | 04.02.09
A core issue not discussed is the need for a new type of internal dialogue in Pakistan; once which breaks from prior prejudices and if ficused on publicizing the benefits of peace and cooperation with like-minded neighbors. The infatuation with viewing India as an active threat, and the resulting need to sponsor militant activities in Kashmir and Afghanistan, is inextricably linked to two generations of Pakistanis who have been brainwashed by their rulers into hating India and Indians. Unless this changes, the electorate, if you can call them that, will not be adequately supportive of a new strategy for international engagement and multilateral counter-terrorism. As India goes to the polls, it is time for Pakistanis to also reassess their love for their own country and demand more from their leadership through open debate.
Mr. Blue
5. Vizzini | 04.02.09
Maybe Petraeus isn’t the one to answer, but the real question is: what happened to the multinational approach? In other words, why exactly do the Europeans, Latin Americans etc. refuse to commit more troops to this, or refuse to change their minds about pulling their existing troops back? And why does the administration think that we can be successful going it alone? What lesson in the last n hundred years of failed foreign occupations of Afghanistan has escaped us here?
And, I think Susan Collins “question” can be answered easily enough: “We will know if we are winning in Afghanistan, Senator, by the same metric we did in Vietnam. When the mayhem subsides, do we have a government friendly to the west?”
6. Iqbal Khan | 04.02.09
There is no discussion about how US intends to “win” this war in Afghanistan. Unlike Iraq where they had support of Shias & Kurds and were only fighting a minority group, Afghanistan is just the opposite. And, if the hope is to divide Talibans into “moderates” (meaning those who will agree to toe American line) and “extremists”, then this is nothing more than a pipe dream.
And, pushing Pakistan is side-stepping the main issue which is the occupation of Afghanistan and as long as it continues, Afghans will continue to fight back.
7. Simplicio T. Soriao | 04.03.09
While the guns are relatively quiet in Iraq except for some random outbursts in some isolated pockets, Afghanistan and its Taliban elements are just beginning to simmer. The military surge which President Bush adopted paid-off, resulting in modest peace and normalcy in the region. With the level of military attainment, the rehabilitation and administration of the land become a manageable effort and offers the US military that much needed respite before embarking on another military endeavor, which is Afghanistan.
The question that the US military must focus on is the extent of the size and strength of the adversary. How strong is the cadre of Talibans controlling the region or regions of Afghanistan? Who are their leaders? How deep is their influence on the tribal chieftains? Must we focus on de-estabilizing the supreme Taliban leadership through diplomacy and accomodation or is it better to continue with the present initiative of taking them out through collective force?
The consensus is that the United States will not deal with terrorist organizations like the Taliban. And to engage them in peaceful talks smacks of appeasement and weakness. On the other hand, the extent of collective force, while same is now underway, may not be the outright solution because of several military and political considerations. The size or target of the enemy has not been reasonably quantified/estimated. Porous borders exist between Afghanistan and Pakistan making it difficult to stem and check the ebb and flow of enemy combatants from both sides. Are these Taliban regulars, brigands desguised as Taliban militants, remnants of the Iraqui theater, or mercenaries exploiting the present conflict?
The US military must rely on personnel who are fluent in Afghan and Pakestani tounges because communication is key in dealing with those powerful tribes whose allegiances are torn between Taliban factions and the present governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This reminds us of the linguistic talent of General Pershing who in the 1900s was successful in subduing the Muslims in Mindanao by communicating with the tribal leaders in their local dialect concerning their common interests and the need for peaceful solutions.
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1. Dennis Peek | 04.01.09
“Mr. Obama is boosting the US force in Afghanistan by about 21,000, on top of the 7,000 additional troops former President Bush had ordered to the country.”
It stopped being “Mr. Obama” after he was sworn in.